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CRIME, LAW AND SQCIAL STRUCTURE
Part I: Methodology
CLARENCE RAY JEFFERY
The author is a member of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology in the
Southern Illinois University'at Carbondale, Illinois. His article on "The Structure
of American Criminological Thinking" was published in this Journal, Volume 46, No.
5, Jan.-Feb., 1956.
The article which follows will be concluded in a later number.-EDroR.
T SOCIOLOGY OF CRm NIAL LAW
In a previous article attention was called to the fact that American criminology
has paid little attention to the study of law and society.1 The positivistic approach,
which limits itself to the study of the criminal, has to be supplemented by an equally
ambitious study of the sociology of law.
The differentiation of normative facts from non-normative ones, or legal norms from other social
norms, of penal law from other legal rules provides the distinctive structure of criminology, that
which denotes specific social data and establishes their significance for criminology . ... But the
major accomplishment is that Sociology of Law is unified by its ultimate reference to "actual"
legal rules. Sociology of Criminal Law, is accordingly, that division of legal sociology which deals
primarily with social phenomena relevant to the norms of penal law; hence Criminology, in this
view, is synonymous with Sociology of Criminal Law.2
In his attempt to be scientific the criminologist has sought the "causes" of crime
in the individual. Crime must be studied as an aspect of institutional systems. Insti-
tutions, not individual offenders, should be the subject matter of criminology. "When
a social phenomenon is defined by law, convention, or any institutional procedure,
we should not assume that it can be referred to any one set of causes lying outside
of the institutional system itself."'
It is vain to seek the causes of crime, as such, or crime anywhere and everywhere. Crime is a
legal category. The only thing that is alike in all crimes is that they are alike violations of the law.
In that sense the only cause of crime is the law itself.... Crime, then, is essentially relative. It has
no inherent quality or property attaching to it as such, attaching to crime of all categories under
all conditions.4
There are two different but related problems in the sociology of law: (1) How
law is differentiated from custom, and how the legal institution is interrelated with
'JEMPRY, CLARENCE R., The Structure of American Criminologicl Thinking, JouR. OF ClM. L.,
CRIM1NOL. AND POL. SCL, January-February, 1956.
HALL, JEROME, Criminology, TWENTIETH CENTURY SOCIOLOGY, ed. by GEORGES GuRVTCH and
WILBERT E. MOORE, New York: Philosophical Library, 1945, pp. 353-354.
3 MACIVER ROBERT M., SOCIAL CAUSATiON, New York: Ginn and Co., 1942, p. 88.
'Ibid., p. 88.
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other institutional structures; 5 and (2) How criminal law is administered. The in-.
formal practices are as important as the formal legal procedures. 6 This paper is
concerned with the first problem.
Methodology
Methodology, as the term is used in contemporary sociology, usually refers to the
statistical techniques which are used in the analysis of a given problem. At this stage
in its development the sociology of law is not prepared for such quantitative analysis.
The object of this study is institutions.
According to MacIver and Page there are three ways in which institutions may
be studied: (1) historical analysis, (2) comparative analysis, and (3) functional
analysis, or the way in which institutions are functionally interrelated in time and
space 7 This functional interdependence of institutions is also labeled an "institu-
tional complex" or "functional system"." According to Timasheff, the functional
approach "refers to the emphasis upon the integration of parts into wholes, or, what
is almost the same thing, the interdependence of parts. .. ."9 This idea is not new
in social thought since it is found in one form or another in Plato, Aristotle, and, in
the nineteenth century, in Spencer, Sumner, Durkheim, Pareto and Weber. 10 Today
functionalism is prominent in the work of the British school of social anthropology-
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown-and in the writings of Talcott Parsons in this
country n The current emphasis on the study of whole cultures is seen in Margaret
Mead's statement that "practices and beliefs can and must be evaluated in context,
in relation to the cultural whole.""
Contemporary functionalism has two aspects which are not accepted in toto by
this writer. First, it has turned the study of social systems and institutions into a
study of individuals. Malinowski reduced functionalism to the biological and primary
needs of the organism.1 3 Parsons reduces the social system to the actor-situation
frame of reference. As Timasheff notes, it is not clear whether the focal point of
Parsons' system is "actors" or social relationships. 4 ". . . Parsons' recent theory has
JERomE HAIL's THEzT, LAW AND SocIETY is an excellent example.
"The American Bar Association is now sponsoring a five-year study of the administration of
criminal justice in the United States. This study will give us a more complete answer to this question.
7 MACIVER, ROBERT M., AND PAGE, CHARES H., SocnETy, New York: Rinehart and Co., 1949,
p. 17.
"IbUd., p. 494 ff.
TIAsHEF, NIcHoLAs S., SocIoLoGIcAL THEORY, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955, pp.
219 -220.
10 This observation led John Gillin to comment: "It is an ironic fact that most of what modem
anthropology has absorbed from the functionalists it could have learned decades earlier from Ameri-
can sociology had it chosen to listen." For a Science of Social Man, ed. by Jomq Gnz.., New York:
Macmillan Co., 1954, p. 19.
11 The British anthropologist was made to realize that societies are functional wholes because of
the experiences the British had in administering a colonial empire.
12 CuLWujA. PATrERNS AND TEcaNoLoGIcAL CHANGE, ed. by MARGARmT MEAn, New York:
Mentor Book, 1955, p. 13.
u GnuN, op. cit., pp. 194-195.
11 TmtSEFF, op. cit., p. 240. See also Roscor AND GISELA HNKI.E, THE DEVELOPMEN OF
MODEouN SOCIOLOGY, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1954, p. 57 ff.
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been described as being as much psychological (and in some measure, psychoana-
lytical) as sociological."'" Parsons has stated that "in a personality considered as a
system there is an internalized culture, while in a social system the counterpart of
internalization in the personality is institutionalization."'16 Such a basic distinction
between groups and institutions must be made. Individuals. belong to groups, not
institutions.17 If we discuss the influence of the Industrial Revolution on the family
system we are focusing attention on institutional relationships; we are not talking
about the group to which John Doe belongs. If we make a basic distinction between
socialization and institutionalization then a great deal of the confusion which exists
in sociological theory, especially criminological theory, can be averted. The one
approach studies the individual; the other studies the social system or institutional
patterns. This paper is concerned with institutions and institutional history, not
with the social psychology of individuals. The writer makes the assumption that the
study of institutions need not and cannot be reduced to a study of the psychology of
individuals.
Second, the study of functional systems has been ahistorical.
Logic and cultural history were separated, and logic became a substitute for history. Cultural
history became irrelevant to an understanding of cultural orgins."
This substitution of logic for history, as seen in Malinowski and Parsons, is as
characteristic of American sociology as is its individualism. 9
American sociology has been generally ahistorical in its approach to the study of society. It has
concerned itself extensively and intensively with the "contemporary" realm of events ... most
American sociologists are ahistorical and have been little concerned with the historical perspective.' 0
Robert Bierstadt recently stated that the source of substantive sociological theory
is history." Pauline Young, in commenting on Rice's book, "Methods in Social
Science," observed "it is of interest that this book includes historians as scientists.""2
Causation
The search for the cause of social change has been as frustrating as the search for
the cause of criminal behavior. The cause of social change has been located in bio-
logical, geographical, technological and cultural factors." If one accepts a functional
approach to the study of society and social change, as outlined above, then the con-
*"Ibid., p. 242.
Is G=N, op. iit., p. 71.
1 MACIVER AND PAGE, op. cit., p. 15.
8 BroNEY, DAVm, THEoRETiCAL ANTHROPOLOGY, New York: Columbia University Press, 1953,
p. 226.
" See the Hn;='s book, cited above.
20 McKnEy, JooN C., Methodology, Procedures and Techniques, to be published in a symposium
on the HisToRY or SocIoLoGY, ed. by HowARD BECKER, and published by Dryden Press, p. 57.
1 BiERsTDT, ROBERT, The Source of Substantive Sociologial Theory, paper read at the 49th an-
nual meeting of the American Sociological Society, 1954.
22 YOUNG, PAuLINE, ScmNirric SocIAL SuRVEYS AND RESEARCH, New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1949, p. 99.23 MAcvER AND PAGE, op. cit., p. 531 ff.
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cept of cause is no longer valid. MacIver and Page reject the deterministic approach
when they note that they are interested in interaction, not reaction.2 4 Kingsley
Davis, following MacIver's analysis of causation, views the "A causes B" notion of
causation as a fallacy, and he substitutes for it a functional, or what he terms an
"equilibrium", approach to a causal analysis.
The functional-structural approach to sociological analysis is basically an equilibrium theory.
It is usually phrased in static terms, but as soon as the element of time is added it alludes to a mov-
ing equilibrium.2
Criminologists have been content to use the "A causes B" notion of cause in their
analysis of criminal behavior.2 6 The fallacy of this approach is that it views certain
factors as independent factors, other factors as reactors. It locates the cause of X in
a single factor or in multiple factors. If the factors in a situation are mutually inter-
dependent, then no one factor can "cause" X. Oxygen does not "cause" water,
neither does hydrogen. In this study of institutions emphasis is placed on interaction
and interrelationships among institutions.
PART II: LAW AND SocIL& CHANGE
Theories of Social Change
In the nineteenth century theories of social change had one thing in common; they
viewed social change as a transition from the tribe to the State; from simple organi-
zation to complex organization; from homogeneity to heterogeneity. This view of
change was in line with the evolutionary concept of change which predominated
nineteenth century thinking. MacIver and Page summarize this theme when they
state that the primitive fusion of institutional functions in the kinship group gave
way to differentiated institutional functions in which separate political, economic,
religious, family and ecological units emerged.? The kinship system passed into a
state system. "Custom passes into law."28
As was pointed out above, these institutions are historically interrelated and
interdependent. They form a "functional complex."
The quickest way to envisage the total social order of a society is to understand its major social
institutions and the relations between these institutions. Thus if a person can grasp the basic eco-
nomic, political, religious, familial, and recreational complexes in the culture of the United States
and can see how they are mutually interdependent, he has mastered the most salient feature of our
social organization.21
In order to understand the topic "law and society" we must understand how the
legal institution is related to the other social institutions which make up our social
2 4Ibid., p. 572.
25 DAVis, KINGSLEY, Hnm _ SOCIETY, New York: Macmillan Co., 1949, p. 634.
26 See MAcIvER, SOCIAL CAUSATION, op. cit. See also PETR LEGINs, Pragmatic Etiology of Delin-
quent Behavior, SocIAL FoacEs, March, 1951, pp. 317-320.27 MACIVER AND PAGE, op. cit., pp. 594-598.
21 Ibid., p. 591 ff.; p. 630 if.
2 DAvis, op. cit., p. 72.
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order. Jerome Hall made use of institutional legal history in his study of theft, law
and society.
Every legal problem arises within the framework of a particular set of social institutions. The
interrelations of these institutions and the interaction between them and the body of legal sanctions
existing at any given time create innumerable problems, in the solution of which the materials of
legal history are made. 0
Historians have recently broadened the scope of their inquiry to include thorough considerations
of social, economic, political and religious conditions. This approach is based upon (a) the alleged
fact that the behavior of people is, by and large, uniform, standardized, and habitual, and that,
as a result, social life may be thought of in terms of "institutions" which denote such behavior;
and (b) that social change is ... to be explained as a result of conditions determined by and rising
from a large network of institutions which are closely interrelated and the impact of these institu-
tions upon each. An institutional interpretation of history does not ignore human factors but em-
phasizes common and recurring, rather than infrequent or individual, modes of behavior.'1
Many concepts have been used in an effort to comprehend the nature of social
change. Spencer viewed change as from homogeneity to heterogeneity. Simple organ-
isms changed into complex organisms with special organs which performed special
functions. Durkheim contrasted mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity. Redfield
uses the terms "folk society" and "urban society". Tonnies talked about Gemein-
schaft and Gesellschaft. Weber saw the change in terms of traditionalistic versus
rationalistic modes of human behavior. Cooley used the terms "primary group" and
"secondary group." Becker uses the terms "sacred" and "secular." Sorokin uses the
terms "familistic" and "contractual."
Loomis and Beegle, using Weber's ideal type method, or the method of construc-
tive typology, arrange the modes of human interaction on a continuum from familistic
Gemeinschaft to contractual Gesellschaft.n By Gemeinschaft Tonnies meant commu-
nity, group interaction dominated by natural will, custom and tradition, as seen in
rural communities. By Gesellschaft he meant society, group interaction dominated by
rational will, deliberate choice, formal interaction. A familistic Gemeinschaft system
is characterized by social interaction with these characteristics: involuntary, primary,
sacred, traditional, emotional, personal authority, unlimited rights and unlimited
responsibilities. A contractual Gesellschaft system is characterized by social inter-
action with these characteristics: voluntary, secondary, secular, rationalistic, imper-
sonal authority, rights and responsibilities limited to station." According to this
scale the Amish rank high on the Gemeinschaft side of the continuum, whereas a
government bureau and a military organization rank high on the. Gesellschaft side.
Legal Theories of Crime
Textbooks in criminology ignore the legal theories of crime. Sir Henry Maine
viewed the transition in authority as a change from status to contract, "from a con-
dition of society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations
"0 HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCrETY, op. cil.,- p. 3.
31 Iid., p. 13.
2Looms, CnARLES P., AD BEEGLE, J. A., RURAL SOcLum SYSmTs, New York: Prentice-Hall,




of Family, we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which
all these relations arise from the free agreement of individuals."u This transition in
authority is also a transition from tort law to criminal law.
Now the penal code of ancient communities is not the law of Crimes; it is the law of Wrongs,
or, to use the English technical word, of Torts .... This peculiarity, however, is most strongly
brought out in the consolidated laws of Germanic tribes. Without exception they describe an im-
mense system of money compensations for homicide, and with few exceptions, as large a scheme
of compensations for minor injuries.... If therefore the criterion of a delict, wrong, or tort is that
the person who suffered it, and not the State, is conceived to be wronged, it may be asseted that
in the infancy of jurisprudence the citizen depends for protection against violence and-fraud not
on the Law of Crime, but on the Law of Tort.n
This shift from tort law to criminal law is likewise a shift from family law to state
law. Lowie, in commenting on the problem of the origin of law, states:
This brings us to the very core of our problem, for what Maine means is that in archaic juris-
prudence it is not the State that is the aggrieved party, but the individual offender and his kindred.
In other words, it is the old question of personal versus territorial relations.36
Emile Durkheim, following Maine's distinction of penal law and restitutiye law,
made a distinction between mechanical solidarity, as found among primitive peoples,
and organic solidarity, as found among modem peoples with a complex division of
labor. He views a violation of mechanical solidarity as a crime, since punishment
takes place. A violation of organic solidarity leads to restitution rather than punish-
ment. The legal system restores to the individual that which has wrongfully been
taken from him.Y It should be noted that Durkheim regarded the law of tort as
characteristic of modern society, whereas Maine regarded tort law as characteristic
of primitive societies.
Max Weber had a three-fold classification of social action: (1) rational-legal, (2)
traditional, and (3) emotional. Each of these modes of conduct had its counterpart
in the social structure. Rational-legal conduct is expressed in a bureaucratic structure;
traditional conduct is expressed in a patriarchal structure; emotional conduct is ex-
pressed in a charismatic structure.ns
Weber's discussion of the sociology of law is based on the various forms which
institutionalized authority may take. Law represents a system of formal rules and
regulations enforced by a bureaucratic structure. Weber makes a clear distinction
between law, custom, and convention. A conduct code is a law if there exists in the
social structure a group which has the authority to use force. "It is only with regard
to the sociological structure of coercion that they differ. The conventional order
lacks specialized personnel for the implementation of coercive power." This authority
is vested in one institution, the State.
a MANE, SIR HENRY, ANciENT LAW, New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1888, p. 163.
35 Ibid., p. 250.36 LowrE, ROBERT, Pamnmnvx SocrETY, New York: Liveright, 1920, p. 398.
37 DURnHnIn, EMILE, TBE DIVIsION or LABOR IN SOCIETY, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1947.
38 WEBER, MAX, LAW IN EcoNoMY AND SociETY, edited by MAX REnEsTEIN, Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1954, pp. 336-337.
19 Ibd., p. 27.
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Today legal coercion by violence is the monopoly of the state.... We shall speak of "State law",
i.e., of law guaranteed by the state, only when, and to the extent that, the guarantee for it, that is,
specific coercion, is exercised through the specific, i.e., normally directed and physical, means of
coercion of the political community.40
Jerome Hall has analyzed criminal law in relation to the changes that have occurred
in society. He views law as a means of solving social problems. In "Theft, Law and
Society," Hall traces the development of the law of theft from the Carrier's Case
through the eighteenth century when the law of theft included such crimes as em-
bezzlement, larceny by trick, and obtaining property by false pretences. "Every legal
problem arises within the framework of a particular set of social institutions". 4'
These changes in the criminal law were brought about by the Industrial Revolution
and the need which it created for a system of law which would protect a modem com-
mercial economy. Hall regards the subject matter of criminology to be "law and
society" rather than the individual offender.4
Primitive Law
The position taken by laine and Weber, namely, that a political authority is
necessary in order to have law, has recently been challenged by anthropologists.
E. S. Hartland declared that "custom is king," meaning that all custom is law.
William Seagle represents another tradition when he states that law and custom are
not one, and primitive peoples do not have law because they do not have courts and
a state system. He denies that there is any such thing as primitive law.M Malinowski
accepts the idea that primitives have law. He rejects the idea that law depends upon
a central authority, courts, and a state system. He states that "in looking for law
and legal forces, we shall try merely to discover and analyze all the rules conceived
.and acted upon as binding obligations .... ,45 Law, according to Malinowski, is a
binding obligation, and that which makes it binding is not the State or a court, but
a system of reciprocity in social relationships.46 MacIver and Page observe that
Malinowski's notion of a "domain of legal rules" is in reality various levels of cus-
tomary control. 7 Hoebel recognizes the difficulty encountered in Malinowski's view
of law when he writes: "If an act produced disorder of any sort, he (-Mfalinowski)
looked upon it as a criminal act."'
Hoebel and Llewellyn attempt to distinguish law and custom while, at the same
time, they deny that a state system is necessary in order to have law.
"0 Ibid., p. 14.
41 HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SocrETY, op. cit., p. 3.
42 JEFFERY, op. cit.
43 HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON, THE LAW OF PRITIV 'MAN, Cambridge; Harvard University Press,
1954, p. 20.
44 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
41 MALINOWSKr, BRONISLAW, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY, London: Kegan, Paul,
Trench, Trubner and Co., 1926, p. 15.
6 Ibid., pp. 63-66.
47 MACIVER AND PAGE, op. Cit., p. 176.
48 HOEBEL, Op. Cit., p. 182.
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The point at which this view of modem culture clarifies the -primitive picture appears in the
concept that not all devices which canalize conduct need be thought of as "law'. The point at which
it obscures is in suggesting that only when officials of the political state come into reckoning-does
it pay to think of any canalizing device as being law-stuff.49
The Cheyenne Way is a study of Cheyenne law, or primitive law. The material
presented here indicates that Cheyenne law was tribal law. Some writers have viewed
the military society.as a quasi-judicial organization; however, when Buffalo Chief
killed another Cheyenne he was exiled from the tribe, though he was acting under
the authority of the military society. 0 The practice of the blood-feud existed or had
existed in Cheyenne history. An aborted fetus was found; however, the feud was pre-
cluded since it occurred within the family unit."' In another place the authors state:
"Homicide had ceased to be legally a matter for blood revenge."-2 Hoebel and
Llewellyn, therefore, used the term "law" to apply to conduct codes sanctioned and
enforced by social units other than the State.
Gerhard Mueller, following the anthropological tradition of Malinowski, Hoebel,
and Llewellyn, criticizes Max Weber for stating that primitives have no criminal
law. Mueller points out that primitives have a system of punishment. ". . . the in-
fliction of a penalty, from whatsoever consideration and under whatsoever aspects,
as a consequence of norm violation, is exactly what we define as criminal in its
nature."-' Law and custom are thus distinguished on the basis of force and punish-
ment.
Hoebel defines law in terms of force. "A social norm is legal if its neglect or infrac-
tion by an individual is regularly met... by the application of physical force by an
individual or group possessing the socially recognized privilege of so acting."54 How-
ever, the group entitled to use force is not the same in the case of primitive groups
and in the case of modem society. Hoebel recognizes this fact when he discusses the
trend of the law. He quotes MacIver to the effect that social change among social
units has been from simple to complex, from homogeneous to heterogeneous. Hoebel
arranges cultural development along an evolutionary line from hunting to pastoral
to agricultural to industrial.55 As we progress from the simple hunting economy to
the industrial economy we progress from tribal law to state law. "As for law, simple
societies need little of it." 6 Social control in primitive groups is in the hands of the
kindred. Social relations are intimate, direct, and face-to-face. Informal types of
social control are used. There is no need for supra-familial authority; there is no need
for state control. 7 Even among highly organized hunters, such as the Comanches
49 HoELn, E. ADA mSON, AND LLEWELLYN, K. N., T=x CaEnmvN WAY, Norman: The Univer-
sity of Oklahoma Press, 1941, p. 23.
50 Ibid., pp. 101-103.
61 Ibid., p. 119.
f' Ibid., p. 132.
-i T Mupr., GEzuw, Tort, Crine and the Primitive, JouR. or CRn. L., CEnMrNoL. AND POL.
Sci., September-October, 1955, p. 311.
4 HoE:BEL, op. cit., p. 28.
1- Ibid.; p. 292.
i6 Ibid., p. 293.
57Ibid., pp. 293-294.
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and Cheyenne, we find the clan and tribe, with tribal law. "Nevertheless, kinship
continues to loom large in the law. Kinsmen stand together. Homicide and adultery
continue to be the chief sources of difficulty, and they remain almost exclusively
private offenses." $ "The development of criminal law remains weak." 59 Among
Higher Hunters 33 percent allowed compensation for most wrongs in the place of
the feud. There was always the right of the feud in the event the payment was not
made.6" Among Horticulturalists 45 percent allow or make mandatory the acceptance
of compensation in lieu of the feud.61 An offense against the individual is an offense
against his clan.6 Gradually, clue to industrialization, urbanization, and population
growth, the kinship tie is dissolved, and in its place we have the institutionalized
chieftainships and the King's Peace." "An offense against the individual has become
a crime against the government."" "The struggle of the law through the ages of
development on the primitive level has revolved around the problem of subordinating
the kin-centered psychology to that of the community."' '65 Hoebel views this shift in
law as one from kinship to State, rather than from status to contract. 66 It must be
remembered, however, that Maine also called attention to this shift from kinship to
State.
Murdock observes that 99 percent of man's history has been without a government.
Among primitives social control is informal, centered in the family. Technological
advances and population growth made these informal controls ineffective, and as a
result State control emerged. Among the Cheyenne the military society was used,
but only for several weeks during the hunt. Most of the time the Cheyenne were
without formal controls. 7 Murdock views the problem of social control as a problem
of formal versus informal control.
In any modem society the regulation of human behavior, even in the smallest community, is
accomplished through an inseparable compound of law and the mores, of institutionalized coercion
and public opinion, of formal sanctions and informal social control.'8
The major difficulty with the anthropologists's use of the term "law" is that it is
used to refer to both family-centered control and State-centered control. It is rather
puzzling to this writer that Hoebel starts his discussion of law by denouncing the
people who define law in terms of a central authority, and then he concludes his
survey of the development of law by noting, as did Maine and Weber, that a shift-
in control has occurred from the family to the State. This use of the term "law" has
58 Ibid., p. 310.
V Ibid., p. 311.
60 Ibid., p. 310.
61 Ibid., p. 318.
r
2 Ibid., p. 318.
0 Ibid., p. 322-329.
6" Ibid., p. 324.
.65 Ibid., p. 322.
66 Ibid., p. 329.
Ul MUuwocK, GEORGE P.. Feasibility and Implemenlation of Comparative Community Research,
AMEzR. SocIOL. REv., December, 1950, pp. 715-716.
6s Ibid., p. 717.
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been the object of criticism by other authors. Cantor points out the difficulty involved
in the use of the term "law" in two different ways when he writes: "What has hap-
pened is that in modern times the judicial and legal institutions of Western European
Society have been detached from other instruments of government and society."
"Until a society has reached the point where there is a differentiation between legal
and other social agencies, criminal law does not really exist as a body of distinct rules,
procedures, and definitions of crime.0 If, as Cantor phrased it, crime is "the function
of a complex Christi an, urban, industrial civilization," 0 then the term "crime" does
not describe primitive data, for the terms "Christian," "urban," and "industrial"
do not describe primitive social systems.
Many sociologists reject the notion that primitives possess a state system. MacIver
denies that the modern state is to be found among primitives7 Kingsley Davis
points out that in primitive societies non-political structures, such as the clan, are
used to maintain social orderY2 Martindale and Monachesi write: "In a sacred society
legitimate power is in the hands of kinship groups. Blood feuds are clan affairs. In
secular societies legitimacy is in the hands of specialized institutions, with a legitimate
basis."73 Cairns compares Malinowski's definition of law with Cardozo's, and he con-
cludes that Malinowski's definition does not apply to modern society, whereas
Cardozo's does not apply to primitive societiesY4 This confusion of law and custom
has been discussed by Morris R. Cohen and Roscoe Pound, and they both conclude
that law and custom can be and must be differentiatedY William Seagle summarizes
this controversy when he states that "the temptation is strong to seek in primitive
society those manifestations which in the modem world have come to be the subject
matter of legal obligation, to select the customs relating to marriage, inheritance,
and property and pronounce them to be primitive law."176
We must be careful in our system of logic if we attempt to use primitive data and
data from modern society in the same system of explanation. The terms "law" and
"crime" do not mean the same thing in these two cases, and it is misleading to use
them to refer to two distinct types of social organization. If we view law as the
product of social organization, then we must distinguish primitive organization from
that which characterizes modern society.
State Law
To further differentiate primitive law and state law a discussion of the character-
istics of state law is in order. The growth and development of the English law from
tribal law to state law supports Maine's thesis that there has been a transition from
69 CANTOR, NATHANIEL, Law and Order in Primitive Society, ENcYcLoPrDIA or CRIMINoLoGY,
p. 340.
70 Ibid., p. 340.
7 1 MAcIvER, ROBERT, THE MODERN STATE, London: Oxford University Press, 1926, pp. 40-42.
72DAvis, op. cit., p. 481-492.
7 MARTn ALE, DON, AND MONACIESI, Euo, ELmET'rS OF SocioLoGy, New York: Harper and
Bros., 1951, p. 458.
14 CALVERTON, V. F., ed., THE MAKINo OF MAN, New York: Modern Library, 1930, pp. 337-338.
75 JE LFERY, op. cit.,
76 SEAGLE, ,VrLLIAmr, THE HISTORY or LAW, New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1946, p. 34.
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kinsh ip authority to territorial authority. It likewise supports Weber's thesis that a
change from traditionalistic to rationalistic authority occurred when the State
emerged as the unit of social order.
If law and crime are functions of the State, then logically we should expect to find
certain characteristics of one reflected in the other. Weber stated that a separate
political community existed when we find "(1) a 'territory'; the availability of physi-
cal force for its domination; and (2) communal action which is not restricted... but
regulates, more generally, the interrelations of the inhabitant of the territory."' ' The
authority of the State rests upon and is limited by (1) its territorial limits, and (2) its
right to use force. Criminal law reflects these characteristics of the State in that (1)
criminal jurisdiction is always territorial, and (2) the final sanction of the criminal
law is force, in the form of a fine, imprisonment, or the death penalty. The use of
force by the State is dramatically seen in the form of the electric dhair or the hang-
man's noose. Other social groups do not maintain electric chairs, though they do
punish offenders. If we define crime as the violation of a conduct code which brings
punishment to the offender, then we would include in our definition -f crime viola-
tions of codes without regard for the social unit or the type of authority involved:
This is exactly the position taken by many criminologists today.78
Criminal law developed as a system of social control when the family no longer
possessed the power or the means to enforce social order. The characteristics of the
law, are, therefore, a reflection of the social relationships that produced the law. The
legal relationship can be designated a contractual Gesellschaft relationship. In the
familistic Gemeinschaft community custom dominates, and there is no separate legal
system; in a contractual Gesellschafl society law becomes a major means of social
control7 Law is more characteristic of urban than rural societies. The legal relation-
ship is impersonal, rationalistic, involuntary, secular, contractual, and secondary.80
Emotions, such as love and hate, are not supposed to be shown. Loomis and Beegle
use the example of General Patton slapping a soldier.8' Generals do not slap soldiers;
they court martial them according to a code of laws. Slapping a soldier would properly
belong to charismatic authority, and Patton might have thought of himself as a
personal leader. A judge is not supposed to show emotions while he administers the
law. It is recognized that emotional feelings do occur in these situations, but when
they do occur they intrude upon the basic structure of the secondary group.
EuRoPEAN AD AmERicAN THEoREs oF CimE CoMPAPED
It should be noted that the legal theories of crime discussed above are of European
origin, with the exception of Hall's work. These men were interested in a type of
sociology different from that which interests American sociologists. Max Rheinstein
observes that American sociology developed as a science of speialties, taking over
77 WBER, op. cit., p. 339.
7 8 JEEERY, op. cit.
7  MERRI.L, FRANCIS P., AND ELDREDGE, H. V., CULTURE AND SocIEy, New York: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1952, pp. 36-38.
80 MACIVER AND PAGE, op. cit., p. 231 ff.
81Looms A BEEGLE, op. cit., p. 805.
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areas not already preempted by the other social sciences, e.g., criminology, race rela-
tions, urbanization; family, and so forth.,, It might also be noted that American
sociology has shown more interest in topics of a social problems nature than in topics
of a more theoretical nature. In Europe sociology was viewed as a synthesizing science,
and it made greater use of political, economic, religious, and legal materials." The
European sociologist is interested in an institutional method, a study of the history
and interrelationships of various institutions, e.g., Weber's study of Protestantism
and capitalism. European sociology is historical in orientation, whereas American
sociology is ahistorical.4 The current interest in social theory and social systems, as
seen in the writings of Parsons, Becker, MacIver, Sorokin, and Znaniecki, can be
traced to this German influence. With the exception of Becker, these men are Euro-
pean-trained scholars. This approach found in German sociology came from the
Institutional School. The Institutional School of economics challenged the British
Classical School on at least three points: (1) The Institutionalists attacked the
narrow and individualistic scope of British thinking, substituting a study of the
interrelationships of institutions in a social whole. (2) The Institutionalists criticize
the static nature of Classical postulates, and in its place they substituted history and
laws of social development. (3) The Institutionalists rejected the abstract method
of the Classical School, and in its place they substituted a realistic study of institu-
tional structures as they developed historically. 5
A comparison of the theories of Hall, Maine, Durkheim, and Weber with those of
Sutherland, Reckless, Sellin, Healy, Sheldon, and the Gluecks, soon reveals certain
fundamental differences. The former group is interested in law and society; the latter
group is interested in the criminal personality. Sutherland's answer to "why do people
behave criminally?" is not the same as Sheldon's, but the question remains the same
in the two cases. This positivistic orientation is the most characteristic aspect of the
American criminology. As a result of this orientation certain problems occur, the
chief of which is the lack of a definition of crime. 6 An example of this confusion is
seen in the question "Is white-collar crime crime?"'s The political community is
functionally interrelated with other institutional structures. From the fifteenth
century to the present the State has been extending its control over other institu-
tions. White-collar crime was the result of this extension of legal controls into the
economic sphere. In order to understand white-collar crime we must understand the
social changes which produced government regulation of business. Sutherland's
treatment of the topic in terms of the theory of differential association ignores the
institutional dimensions of the problem, and for that reason Tappan, Burgess, and
others can criticize the validity of the concept. A definition of crime can never be es-
tablished by studying the personality makeup of offenders. A study of white-collar
crime patterned after Hall's study of theft, or Weber's study of law and economy,
' WEBER, op. Cr., p. XXVii.
13 Ibid., p. Xxvii.
91 See above discussion.
85 WrITTAKER, EDmu-'D, A HISTORY OF EcoNoMIc IDPAs, New York: Longmans, Green and
Co., 1940, 732 ff.
16 JEFFERY, op. Cit.
87 SU-R sLAND, EDwiN H., WmiTr CoLT-AR CRnm, New York: Dryden Press, 1949, p. 29 ff.
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would reveal the nature of this relationship between State and economy. As Weber
pointed out, property and contractual rights can be protected by the kinship group.18
It is characteristic of our modem society that they are legal relationships. White-
collar crime is a result of this institutional arrangement, and a study of the social
system is the only way to answer the question "Is white-collar crime crime?"
SUMMARY
(1) A theory of crime depends upon an institutional study of law and society. The
cause of crime is to be found in the legal and social institutions, not in the individual
offender.
(2) The method used is that of institutional history. It emphasizes the functional
interdependence of the various parts of the social system. It rejects the individualistic
and ahistorical orientation of the British school of functionalism.
(3) The concept of cause is replaced by one of function, or interdependence.
(4) The approach is normative, that is, it focuses attention on the social norms and
institutional structures which make up the normative order by which behavior is
judged to be social or antisocial, legal or illegal.
(5) Legal norms are related to the social changes that occur in these institutional
structures. Historically, the State has replaced the family as the unit of social control.
Law now emerges as the formal system of maintaining social order and control. Crime
emerges as a result of this institutional arrangement and social change.
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